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Abstract—Vehicles today are relying more on technologies
to bring about fully autonomous features. The conventional
wirings within are being simplified into a network of electronic
components, and this network is controlled via advanced sensing
of the environment to make decisions in real-time. However, with
the heavy reliance on the sensor readings, any inaccurate reading
from the sensors could result in decisions that may cause life-
threatening incidents. As such, this research focuses on the in-
depth assessment of potential vulnerabilities of an important and
commonly used obstacle sensing device, which is the ultrasonic
sensor, in modern as well as autonomous vehicles. This research
will help bring awareness to the car manufacturers and AV
researchers so as to mitigate such issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motor vehicles became popular in the 20th centuries as
the main mode of transport of people and goods. As tech-
nologies become more advanced, the motor vehicles evolved
into a system which incorporates electronics to bring about
modern entertainment, navigation, perception, and localization
features. Thus, modern vehicles are not simply about motors
and wheels anymore; they are equipped with a network system
that connects the electronic components together, which allows
these vehicles to have sensing capabilities (i.e. being able
to detect obstacles and to warn drivers who are driving
these vehicles [18]). However, these modern vehicles that are
integrated with the network system have its own drawback
- telematics and sensors equipped to the vehicle might be
compromised by adversaries and the vehicle can be immo-
bilised or be “instructed” to act in a disorderly manner, causing
inconvenience or even danger to the road users [20] [15] [16].
An autonomous vehicle [21] is a self-driving vehicle that
has the capability to reach its destination without any human
intervention. The vehicle uses advanced sensors to detect and
identify objects so as to make informed decisions to support
automated navigations. The potential benefits of autonomous
vehicles include the reduction of traffic collision and fuel
consumption, and also the enhancement of the mobility of
elderly, children, as well as the disabled. It can potentially
help people save time on the road and have more time to do
things while on their journey to the destination [19]. To do so
in a safe manner, it is necessary to ensure that the autonomous
vehicle operate in a safe and secure manner. It implies that, at
a minimal, the availability and integrity of the sensor signals
should be verified to be in place. However, with the major role
that these sensors play in the automotive industry, it is very
likely that they become the most common target of attacks for
the adversaries.
Attacks on the sensor can be through a remote compromise
or a physical attack to generate incorrect signals into the
vehicle systems. In this paper, we aim to unveil the possibilities
of a sensor being compromised, through different experiments
to perform an in-depth safety and security assessment of the
ultrasonic sensor.
This paper is organised as follows: Section II presents the
background and the related work for this research, while in
Section III, we present the threat model and experimental
design. We discuss the test cases and evaluation results in
Section IV. Finally, the research conclusion and the future
work are discussed in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
Cyber-physical features [16] are semi-autonomous features
that exist in modern vehicles as well as in autonomous
vehicles [2] to assist the driver while parking or driving on
the road to prevent accidents from happening. The vehicles
rely on these sensors data and the data are being computed
through the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to determine each
action to be taken subsequently. Park Assist is one of these
features that are commonly used in a modern vehicle.
A. Park Assist
Park Assist [16] [8] is a feature that helps the driver park
in tight spots. The system uses mainly the ultrasonic sensor
to detect the obstacle and calculates the optimum steering
angle during parking. The sensor then integrates its readings
with the back-up camera to provide the parking information
to the driver. This feature is only available when the vehicle is
moving very slowly, and in practice, there are typically safety
mechanisms that try to prevent the wheel from turning due to
this feature when the vehicle is at anything but slow speed.
Tesla has also integrated such a feature in its vehicle, which
is known as the Summon self-parking feature [10].
With the implementation of such a “Park Assist” feature
in vehicles as one of their primary cyber-physical features,
vehicle manufacturers have also provided users with a user
manual, in which it warns users to take note that the sensor
may not function properly under certain conditions [6].
Fig. 1. Echolocation used by ultrasonic sensor
Ultrasonic sensor (also known as sonar) is a sensor that
uses echolocation (see Figure 1) [3] to determine if an object
is in the range of the sensor. The sensor is also capable of
determining the object distance by using the time taken by the
signal to come back to the ultrasonic sensor after emitting it.
However, the limitation of ultrasonic sensors is its blind zone
at close proximity and the noise interference, which might
cause the readings to be inaccurate [12]. Readings of ultrasonic
sensors can also be compromised by materials like acoustic
foam as such materials have sonic wave dampening ability [5].
B. Related Work
There have been several studies in the security of the
automotive system and they mainly focused on the network
system of the vehicle - CAN Bus. CAN Bus is a standard
designed to allow Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and devices
to communicate with one another in applications without
a host computer [18]. Each of these ECUs has its own
responsibility to read signals coming from the sensor placed
at different parts of the vehicle. The CAN bus allows the
ECU to send these readings to other ECUs in the network.
The ECU will act accordingly if the readings are relevant
to its operations. As a substitution of the conventional multi-
wire looms, the CAN Bus allows these ECUs to communicate
on a single or dual-wire network data bus supporting up to
1Mbps [18].
In [15], the authors have demonstrated attacks like unau-
thorised actuation, Denial of Service (DOS), faking a system
state and eavesdropping internal information of the vehicle and
these attacks violated the security model of the information
being exchanged - CIA traits. These attacks can result in
catastrophic effect, such as potential road accidents, monetary
loss, and even loss of human lives. These attacks can be carried
out simply by injecting malicious code to the ECUs, given
physical access to the vehicles.
In [16] [17], the authors have researched on the CAN
transport protocol. The paper mentioned that even though
some of the vehicle manufacturers deviate from the standards,
the means of invoking an attack are very much similar. There
are also services that an adversary can tap on to compromise
the ECU, the CAN-Bus physically as well as through its
telematics features. Denial of service is also demonstrated
by using the compromised ECU to flood the network with
packets.
In [14], the researchers focused on the physical aspects of
autonomous vehicle attacks. The idea of their research is that
the hacker may not need to access the CAN-Bus remotely to
manipulate a vehicle as the adversary would be able to attack a
vehicle through the use of jammers. A jammer can manipulate
readings from various sensors such as the ultrasonic sensors
and radar sensors. However, conducting such an attack would
be costly as it requires a high-end sophisticated frequency
jammer. In [4], another group of researchers demonstrated
an attack to negatively affect the ultrasonic sensors’ sensing
capability through the use of acoustic foam, to show that
acoustic materials have sonic wave dampening effect on the
sensors.
III. EXPERIMENTAL ATTACKS ON ULTRASONIC SENSORS
It is now evident that many (autonomous) vehicles in the
market are using ultrasonic sensors as the basis to detect
obstacles to assist in driving and parking. This section outlines
some experimental attacks that can be launched on ultrasonic
sensors in a laboratory environment, which could cause a
serious impact on the road. Specifically, this paper investigates
the impact on the ultrasonic sensor in the following scenarios:
• Blind-spot range is affected by the area of exposed
surface of the obstacle.
• Covering of either or both ultrasonic transmitter and
receiver affects the detection accuracy.
• Obstacle made of certain material will cause the reading
of ultrasonic sensor to be inaccurate.
• A secondary ultrasonic sensor or any sound waves device
will interfere with the primary ultrasonic sensor, and thus
affecting the reading of the sensor.
The experiment set-up and test-cases to validate these
hypothesis are explained in the following sections.
A. Adversary Model
Knowledge of vehicles – The CAN-bus architecture and
its communication model is public knowledge. This allows the
adversary to study about CAN-Bus as well as the sensors used
by the (autonomous) vehicles. In addition, by consulting the
various experts in the automotive industry, the adversary gets
a better understanding of the functionalities and capabilities
of the vehicle sensors. Thus, enabling the adversary to learn
the capability of creating devices that can be used to alter the
sensor signal, or to interfere with the sensor readings.
Access to vehicles – The adversary is assumed to have no
access to the vehicle other than the vehicle’s exterior. Hence,
tapping on the CAN-bus communication is not possible, and
injection spurious messages into the vehicle’s internal commu-
nication system is not feasible. However, the adversary have
full access to the ultrasonic sensors visible on the vehicle’s
exterior, and potential tampering of the sensor is possible by
exploiting the flaws of the exposed sensors.
Limitations – It is further assumed that the adversary can
only launch attacks on the ultrasonic sensors without being
seen by a human user, i.e., the driver or owner of the attacked
vehicle. Any sign of tampering on the ultrasonic sensors
cannot be detected by the bare eyes. We further assume that the
Fig. 2. HC-SR04
vehicle’s internal system is protected by security mechanisms
(e.g. data encryption and device authentication).
B. Sensor Platform and Experiment Setup
The experiments to validate the hypothesis were conducted
in a laboratory environment. Figure 2 shows a commercially
available off-the-shelf ultrasonic sensor, HC-SR04 used in
our experiments to simulate the obstacle detection mechanism
in vehicles [13]. The ultrasonic sensor was connected to an
Arduino Uno R3 as illustrated in Figure 3. Arduino was chosen
as a microprocessor for its portability, cost and simplicity to
interface with the sensors [1]. Vehicles use beeping sound to
indicate that there’s an obstacle detected in real life. In our
experiments, three LED were used as a replacement of the
beeping sensor.
Fig. 3. Arduino Uno R3
Figure 4 shows the experimental platform interconnecting
the ultrasonic sensor with the Arduino Uno R3 and three LED
lights. In this set-up, the Arduino Uno draws its power through
a USB connection and then supplies the power to the circuit by
connecting 5V and GND to the positive and negative side of
the breadboard respectively. The HC-SR04 ultrasonic sensor
is powered by connecting the VCC pin and the GND pin to
the positive and negative side of the breadboard. Digital pin
11 was set as OUTPUT mode, while digital pin 12 was set as
INPUT mode where they were connected to the trigger pins
and echo pins on the HC-SR04 sensor respectively. Digital
pins 8, 9, 10 were set as OUTPUT mode as they were attached
to the positive side of the LED to light the relevant LED
depending on the distance detected from the ultrasonic sensor.
The negative side of the LED was then connected to the
negative side of the breadboard to form a complete circuit.
The sensor platform exhibits the following behaviour: All
LEDs are lit when it first starts up. After the LED is lit for
2 seconds, it will start lighting up the relevant LED based on
the obstacle’s distance away from the ultrasonic sensor. If the
distance is more than 30 cm, the green LED (the left most LED
as shown in Figure 4) will be lit up. For a detected distance
between 15 cm to 30 cm, the yellow LED, i.e., the middle
Fig. 4. Design of the experimental platform
LED, will be lit up. Lastly, if the distance falls below 15 cm,
which means that the obstacle is very near to the sensor, the
red LED will be lit up, the right-most LED.
The ultrasonic sensor produces an output value (in micro-
second), which is used to derive the distance of the obstacle
from the sensor. The output is a measure of the round trip time
between the sensor emitting a pulse, and receiving the pulse in
return when there is an obstacle. The output is divided by two
because it is the time taken for the pulse to be sent out from
the sensor and returned back to the sensor. Since the speed of
sound is 340 m/s, i.e., 29 microseconds per cm, the distance
can be calculated using the following equation [9].
distance = (output/2)/29 (1)
C. Simulation of Attacks on Ultrasonic Sensors
Modern vehicles are mostly equipped with their propri-
etary “Park Assist”, which relies on the ultrasonic sensors
to determine and to avoid obstacles that are in the vehicle’s
way. Furthermore, drivers using these features are required
to leave their key in the ignition. As such, some test cases
may not be applicable to the modern vehicles as the drivers
would have some form of control over the vehicle. However,
accident may still happen if the drivers are not cautious about
their surroundings or if the drivers fully rely on the sensor’s
feedback.
Tesla on the other hand, has its car equipped with a semi-
autonomous function – Summon [10], which provides the user
with the capability to perform auto-pilot on the car and to
enable auto-parking. This auto-park capability allows Summon
to park the vehicle while the driver is away from the vehicle.
Summon can be activated with a mobile application [7], which
is the fulcrum of the test case as the test case seeks to
investigate the vulnerability of these autonomous features
such as its limitations and the triggering of false warnings.
Upon analysing the Tesla Model S owner’s manual [6] and
other vehicle manufacturer’s user manuals [11], we designed
four test cases to simulate attacks on ultrasonic sensors, to
demonstrate the effect of tampering of the sensor on a semi-
autonomous vehicles.
1) Test Case 1: Thin Object as an Obstacle: The objective
of this test case is to determine if the object’s area of exposure
affects the distance detection limit of the ultrasonic sensor.
This experiment was conducted to proxy a scenario, whereby
the vehicle can park itself inside a parking lot which has a
thin obstacle in its way.
Typically, a vehicle is equipped with four sensors at its
rear and it is believed that there could possibly be a blind
spot in which a thin obstacle could not be detected by the
ultrasonic sensors. It is hypothesised that the relatively widely
spaced sensors may not be able to detect a thin obstacle
when the vehicle reverses into the sensor’s blind range. In
this experiment, a straw, chopstick, hairpin and a card were
used as a thin obstacle to simulate such an attack.
Although the sensor used in the experiment is different from
any modern vehicle, the vehicle’s and the experiment’s sensor
use the same underlying mechanism to detect an obstacle.
Therefore, in this test case, the blind range of the thin obstacle
can be determined.
2) Test Case 2: Covering of the Transmitter and Receiver:
This test case aims to determine the accuracy of the ultra-
sonic sensor’s readings when either or both of the transmitter
and receiver are blocked. This experiment was conducted to
demonstrate a scenario in which the sensors are being covered
by an object, and to show that such an attack has an adverse
effect on the accuracy in obstacle detection. The sensor used
in the experiment should work the same way as the sensor
used by any vehicle in the market, thus allowing us to draw
a conclusion from this experiment. Scotch tape was used to
cover both the transmitter and receiver of the ultrasonic sensors
in this experiment.
Many vehicle manufacturers have warned that users should
not install any accessories or stickers on or near the parking
sensor. The postulation is that the installation of stickers or
accessories on or near the parking sensor might cause a false
reading recorded by the sensor. In situations where the au-
tonomous feature is used to park the car, if the parking sensor
(i.e., ultrasonic sensor) has been compromised or tampered
with physically, the vehicle might not be able to detect any
obstacle, and thus may cause a collision to occur.
3) Test Case 3: Using Acoustic Foam: The objective of this
test case is to demonstrate that using materials such as acoustic
foam can mask the presence of an object to the ultrasonic
sensor. This experiment was conducted to proxy a scenario
whereby the acoustic foam is attached to the adversary’s
vehicle, thus causing the inability of the parking sensor to
detect the adversary’s vehicle.
Acoustic foam is an open cell foam which can absorb sound
waves of medium to high range in the frequency spectrum [5].
The sound absorbed by the foam will then be dissipated, thus
resulting in the inability of ultrasonic sensors to detect any
obstacle. In this experiment, acoustic foam was used as a
medium between an object and the ultrasonic sensor.
It is envisaged that when the vehicle is performing auto-
parking without its driver’s supervision, the detection of
obstacles must be accurate. If there exists an adversary’s
vechicle in the vicinity and it is covered with an acoustic foam,
this could potentially cause the vehicle to collide with the
adversary’s vehicle. Such an attack can be exploited, allowing
the adversary to file for a claim from the insurance company
or to cause monetary loss to the victim if the situation is not
assessed carefully.
4) Test Case 4: Creating Interference using Additional
Ultrasonic Sensors: The objective of the test case is to prove
that interference can cause inaccurate readings. When two
ultrasonic sensors are placed opposite to each other, it will
cause interference.
This experiment was conducted to demonstrate a scenario
in which the rear of both vehicles are facing each other
while performing feature like auto-parking. In this case, it
may cause both vehicles to behave abnormally due to the
inaccurate sensor readings caused by the interference as there
is no human intervention. Such an attack can be simulated by
placing two ultrasonic sensors facing each other, thus causing
the ultrasonic sensors to receive echo of itself and the echo of
the other sensor. As a result, the readings of the ultrasonic
sensor will be inconsistent, degrading the accuracy of the
sensor.
A possible attack scenario would be while the user is
performing auto-parking in between two stationary vehicles, if
one of the stationary vehicles has an ultrasonic sensor installed
at the same level to the parking sensor of a car in order to cause
interference to the vehicle trying to perform auto-parking; it
could possibly cause the parking vehicle to collide with the
stationary vehicles due to the interference with the parking
sensors, thus resulting in potential vehicle damage.
IV. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
A. Test Case 1: Thin Object as an Obstacle
This experiment was conducted to determine the blind range
of the ultrasonic sensor, in particular to determine the ability of
the sensors to detect thin objects as obtacles. Four test subjects,
namely a straw, a chopstick, a hairpin, and a card were used
in this experiment.
Figure 5 shows the experimental setup in this test case.
The ultrasonic sensor was calibrated with the ruler, indicating
distance of the test subjects from the sensor. The shaded area
shows a path located in between the ultrasonic sensors, as this
is to allow the test subjects to traverse through the shaded path
away from the ultrasonic sensors during the experiment. The
set-up was kept at a distance range of up to 30 cm as the test
subjects were small and it was difficult to traverse within the
shaded path for a distance longer than 30 cm. The yellow box
at the other end marks the end point of the test.
TABLE I
BLIND-SPOT RANGE FOR THIN OBJECTS
Test Subjects Blind-Spot Range
Straw 0 - 1 cm
Chopsticks 0 - 1 cm
Hairpin 0 - 10 cm
Card 0 - 20 cm
Table I shows the results of the experiment, indicating the
thinnest test object has the highest blind-spot range. This
means that if an ultra thin object is placed in between two
Fig. 5. Physical set-up for Test Case 1, 2, 3
ultrasonic sensors, this object has a higher probability that it
will not be detected. In our experiment, the card is the thinnest
object and the result shows that the card could not be detected
by the ultrasonic sensors when it was placed between 0-20 cm
away from the sensors.
There is a possibility that the ultrasonic sensor built in a
vehicle has a higher blind-spot range. Thus, it may require
more ultrasonic sensors to be placed on different parts of the
vehicle to detect obstacles at various angles. Alternatively, the
vehicle manufacturer can include multiple sensors to work
together in order to detect obstacles more accurately.
B. Test Case 2: Covering of the Transmitter and Receiver
Test case 2 was conducted using a similar set-up as shown in
Figure 5. The experiment tested the accuracy of the ultrasonic
sensors in three different conditions: (1) Both the transmitter
and the receiver were blocked or covered. (2) Only the trans-
mitter was blocked, and (3) Only the receiver was blocked.
A credit-card sized cardboard was used as the obstacle,
traversing through the shaded path away from the ultrasonic
sensors until it reached the end point. Table II shows the results
of the readings by an ultrasonic sensor at various distances
away from the ultrasonic for different sensor conditions.
We conclude that for all three conditions experimented, the
ultrasonic sensors were unable to detect the obstacle, and
returned out of range readings.
TABLE II
ULTRASONIC SENSOR READINGS WHEN SENSORS ARE BLOCKED
Sensor Conditions 10 cm away 20 cm away 30 cm away
Both transmitter and out of range out of range out of range
receiver blocked
Transmitter blocked out of range out of range out of range
Receiver blocked out of range out of range out of range
Therefore, it is important that the ultrasonic sensors are
examined regularly to ensure that they are not covered or
blocked in any ways, so that accidents and collusions can be
avoided.
C. Test Case 3: Using Acoustic Foam
Test case 3 was also conducted using a similar set-up
as Figure 5 It was thought that acoustic foam can not be
easily detected by the ultrasonic sensors due to its sound-wave
absorbing characteristic. In this experiment, we investigated
Fig. 6. Ultrasonic set-up for Test Case 4
the accuracy of detecting an object made of acoustic foam
using the ultrasonic sensors. Three scenarios were tested,
namely: (1) Using acoustic foam singularly, (2) A plastic bottle
wrapped with acoustic foam, and (3) A softdrink can wrapped
with acoustic foam.
The experiment was conducted by moving the test material
along the shaded path. If the test material was detected,
its distance from the ultrasonic sensors was recorded. In
this experiment, the boundary of the experiment setup was
extended to 35 cm for the test material to be in place.
TABLE III
SENSOR READINGS FOR DETECTING OBJECTS WRAPPED WITH FOAM
Test Materials 10 cm Away 20 cm Away 30 cm Away
from Sensor from Sensor from Sensor
Acoustic foam 37 cm 37 cm 37 cm
Bottle wrapped 69 cm - 91 cm - out of range
with Foam out of range out of range
Drink Can wrapped 70 cm - out of range out of range
with Foam out of range
Table III shows the results of the readings recorded by the
ultrasonic sensors. The results clearly show the inaccuracy in
the detection of obstacle, in which when the drink can was
wrapped with an acoustic foam, even though it was placed 30
cm from the sensor, the sensor returned out of range reading,
indicating that the obstacle could not be detected. We conclude
that acoustic foam can effectively be used to mask the obstacle
presence from the sensor, thus giving an inaccurate reading.
This attack is cost effective and it targets users who are
not aware of their surroundings. This attack can be dreadful
since the obstacle can mask its presence, thus resulting in the
inability of the sensor to detect obstacles accurately.
D. Test Case 4: Interference with Additional Sensors
Figure 6 shows the experimental setup for this test case,
by using two ultrasonic sensors facing one another to create
interference. The distance recorded by each ultrasonic sensor
was then recorded to determine whether any interference had
occurred.
Table IV shows the results indicating the sensor readings of
the ultrasonic sensor. The obstacle detection distance seems
to be always shorter than the actual distance between the two
sensors. For example, when the sensors are 30 cm apart from
each other, Sensor 1 detected that there was an obstacle 14-
17 cm away, and similar readings were recorded by Sensor
2. We thus conclude that both ultrasonic sensor readings are
inaccurate when facing each other, as the sound waves from
external source would significantly affect the accuracy of the
ultrasonic sensor.
TABLE IV
RESULTS SHOWING INTERFERENCE FROM ADDITIONAL SENSOR
Actual Distance Sensor 1 Readings Sensor 2 Readings
10 cm 5 - 7 cm 3 - 4 cm
20 cm 3 - 20 cm 0 - 17 cm
30 cm 4 - 29 cm 1 - 26 cm
14 -17 cm (intermittent) 12 - 16 cm (intermittent)
As the autonomous vehicle would be deployed in the near
future, if any of its features rely heavily on ultrasonic sensor
readings, it may cause serious issues (e.g. traffic congestion) as
the sensor may falsely detect obstacles due to the interference
from other ultrasonic sensors in the vicinity.
E. Countermeasures and Mitigation Strategy
The test cases results have shown that the ultrasonic sensor
can be easily compromised by off-the-shelf materials and this
causes devastating effects on the road. In this section, we
propose countermeasures to mitigate and reduce the risks to
guarantee the safety of the vehicles and its passengers.
Multi-sensor fusion consisting of multiple ultrasonic sensors
should be adopted to allow for multiple sensor data to be
validated and cross-checked to mitigate the discrepancy result-
ing from Test Case 1, 3, and 4. We anticipate that ultrasonic
sensors will continue to be used in autonomous vehicles as
its detection speed is fast, and effective. Additionally, it can
be used in combination with camera mounted on the vehicle
for obstacle detection purpose, so that the detection can be
corroborated with multiple data sources.
Test case 2 can be mitigated by performing a fast calibration
upon vehicle starts-up, to ensure that all sensors (including the
ultrasonic sensors) are working properly.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The experiments conducted in this research were based on
scenarios that could possibly occur in real life. Although they
were performed in a laboratory setting, we have successfully
demonstrated and simulated four attack scenarios on ultrasonic
sensors, resulting in the inaccuracy in detecting obstacles using
ultrasonic sensors.
We further demonstrated that the findings from our experi-
ments show that an adversary can easily cause the ultrasonic
sensors to behave abonormally when they are blocked, inter-
fered by another ultrasonic sensor in the vicinity. In fact, these
attacks are relatively low cost and can be easily replicated.
We thus advocate that in order to use ultrasonic sensors
for guiding vehicle control, a multi-sensors should be imple-
mented in order to allow these sensors to collaborate with
each other to improve the accuracy of detection. Similarly,
for fully autonomous vehicles, it is important that ultrasonic
sensors are used in collaboration with the other-type of sensors
so that these attacks on ultrasonic sensors can be mitigated.
In the future, we plan to extend the research by exploring
the vulnerabilities of other sensors used in both modern
and autonomous vehicles. It is also possible to attempt to
compromise a set of sensors working together, so as to identify
the vulnerabilities (and the associated impact) that lay within
these autonomous features.
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